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Banks’ Equity Performance and the 
 Term Structure of Interest Rates 
 
Abstract 
Using an extensive global sample, this paper investigates the impact of the term structure of 
interest rates on bank equity returns.  Decomposing the yield curve to its three constituents 
(level, slope and curvature), the paper evaluates the time-varying sensitivity of the bank’s 
equity returns to these constituents by using a diagonal dynamic conditional correlation 
multivariate GARCH framework.  Evidence reveals that the empirical proxies for the three 
factors explain the variations in equity returns above and beyond the market-wide effect.  
More specifically, shocks to the long-term (level) and short-term (slope) factors have a 
statistically significant impact on equity returns, while those on the medium-term 
(curvature) factor are less clear-cut.  Bank size plays an important role in the sense that 
exposures are higher for SIFIs and large banks compared to medium and small banks.  
Moreover, banks exhibit greater sensitivities to all risk factors during the crisis and post-
crisis periods compared to the pre-crisis period; though these sensitivities do not differ for 
market-oriented and bank-oriented financial systems. 
 
JEL codes:  C32, E43, G21 
Keywords:  Banks, Yield Curve, Equity Return, Interest Rate Risk, Economic Cycles. 
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1. Introduction 
The specialness of financial intermediaries and banking in particular is well discussed 
in the finance literature with emphasis on the unique structure of the bank’s balance sheet 
(Beston, 2004; Saunders and Cornett, 2017).  The “new” originate-to-distribute model, 
adopted by banks, has enabled them to tap into new funding channels (e.g. asset-backed 
securities, derivatives, etc.), which in turn has broadened their investment activities via the 
creation of new asset classes such as collateralised asset obligations and other structured 
products (Shin, 2009; Purnanandam, 2011).  Recent findings on the causes of the 2007 
financial crisis point to the balance sheet structure of the banking firm (Farhi and Tirole, 
2012; Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013), while the inherent leverage-adjusted duration/ 
convexity gap of the bank’s assets and liabilities underlines its exposure to interest rate 
fluctuations (Flannery and James, 1984a; Anderson and Cakici, 1999; Entrop et al., 2008, 
Alessandri and Nelson, 2015; English et al., 2018). 
The significance of interest rate changes was documented much earlier by Merton 
(1973) and Long (1974) where, under the assumption of a stochastic risk-free rate, investors 
are exposed to another kind of risk, namely, the risk of unfavorable shifts in the investment 
opportunity set.  In reality, the bank’s portfolio (assets/liabilities) contains a wide range of 
instruments with different maturities and, thus, broader yield curve features highlight the 
evolution of market expectation in response to changing economic conditions and the bank’s 
risk exposure.  This point is reinforced by the recent Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2016) where banks are required to measure their 12-month net interest income 
while balancing the multiple maturities in their portfolio. 
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Yield curve properties have a distinctive influence on the investors’ perception about 
risk-return relationships as they are linked to business cycle conditions (Dewachter and 
Lyrio, 2006; Diebold et al., 2006; Aguiar-Conraria et. al., 2012) and consequently to the 
bank’s equity performance.  Thus, using a single point of the yields’ distribution (e.g. three-
month T-bill) overlooks the impact of the whole spectrum of yield changes on the market 
value of the bank’s overall portfolio.  This issue becomes nontrivial when investment 
portfolios with expected and contingent cash flows of different maturities are considered.  
Therefore, the limitations of analysing bank equity’s yield sensitivity on the basis of yield 
point changes, as opposed to yield curve changes, become economically relevant (see 
surveys by Staikouras (2003, 2006) on financial intermediaries’ interest rate risk exposure). 
The current paper investigates the potential exposure of banks’ stock returns to interest 
rate risk by explicitly taking into account the level, slope and curvature of the entire term 
structure of interest rates (yield curve).  More specifically, the present study contributes to 
the literature in four fronts.  First, it deploys the level, slope and curvature of the term 
structure of interest rates, derived from a three-factor interest rate model, to examine the 
exposure of bank’s equity to yield curve fluctuations across all maturities.  These three-
factors are used as independent risk factors in the banks’ equity return generating process.  
The decomposition of the yield curve into its three components provides a research design 
that aims to overcome the caveats of earlier work focusing on fixed maturity yield changes 
and ignoring the effect of changes in the shape of the term structure or that of a “twist” in 
the yield curve1.  Previous empirical studies have tried to resolve the issue by considering 
                                                 
1 The Bank of International Settlements has recently increased the requirement for the banks’ interest rate 
risk exposure further emphasizing the importance of the yield curve changes.  See Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2016) – https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d368.htm. 
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multiple yield measures with different maturities and/or term spreads with the exception of 
Dzaja et al. (2009).  Yet, an important consideration is that yield changes across different 
maturities are not perfectly correlated and, thus, using different maturities in isolation can 
lead to misleading results.  Second, the paper sheds light on the interface between the 
dynamics of the wider economy and the yield curve exposure of the banking firm by 
incorporating a period long enough to embrace different phases of the business cycle, as 
well as both the crisis and non-crisis periods.  One stylized fact of the yield curve is that its 
shape is intimately connected to the cyclical dynamics of the economy (Diebold et al., 
2006).  The yield curve tends to be steeper near the trough of the business cycle, while 
relatively flat near its peak.  This feature directly influences banks’ risk profile, since their 
leverage and credit generating capacity (balance-sheet size) are determined by the interest 
rate environment where they operate2.  Thus, when the yield curve is upward sloping during 
an economic boom, banks expand their balance sheet through leverage, subject to regulatory 
capital requirement, to take advantage of the carry spread (Adrian and Shin, 2008).  On the 
other hand, during an economic downturn, banks may experience difficulties to rollover 
these debts as a result of shortage in funding liquidity (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011).  
Using a dataset covering both the pre-, during and post-financial crisis periods allows this 
research to present fresh evidence of the banks’ yield sensitivities during different business 
cycles.  Third, the research setup allows for potential time-variation in yield betas by 
employing the diagonal dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH (diagonal 
DCC-MGARCH) model.  Unlike the conventional regression models, this econometric 
                                                 
2 Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) argue that the main driver behind the recent financial crisis (2007-09) was the 
prolonged and low short-term interest rates as a result of the monetary policy observed in the U.S. and the 
Euro-area.  The low short-term rates soften the lending standard for household and corporate loans and 
encourage banks to rely heavily on short-term borrowing that leverages up their balance sheets. 
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framework allows for the dynamic evolution of the institutions’ interest rate risk exposure 
and facilitates pair-specific correlation dynamics and asymmetries in the conditional 
variances.  Moreover, it accommodates the heteroscedastic nature of equity returns and 
overcomes the issue of multicollinearity among exogenous variables3.  Fourth, the analysis 
is based on a global sample of banking firms across major market-oriented (U.S./U.K.) and 
bank-oriented (Japan/Europe) financial systems4.  To this end, equally weighted country 
banking portfolios are constructed, which are further divided into size portfolios, based on 
total asset value, in order to differentiate between systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFI), large, medium and small size banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the 
methodological framework employed.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 discusses the 
empirical findings, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Yield Curve Term Structure Model 
Interest rate risk exposure has been traditionally measured by the coefficients from a 
two-factor multiple regression model between equity returns and changes in the market 
factor and interest rate factor with a fixed maturity (Flannery and James, 1984b; Elyasiani 
and Mansur 1998; Oertmann et al., 2000; Elyasiani et al., 2007; Bessler and Kurmann, 2014 
among others).  Banking institutions, however, hold assets and liabilities across a wide 
                                                 
3 Previous studies try to sidestep the issue of interdependence between the market and interest rate risk factors 
by orthogonalizing the risk factors (Flannery and James, 1984b; Oertamnn et al., 2000), but the 
orthogonalization approach can introduce estimation bias to the regression model (Giliberto, 1985). 
4 Under a bank-oriented financial structure the main contributor of capital allocation, provision of risk 
management platforms and savings’ mobilization is the bank.  On the other hand, under a market-oriented 
system security markets alongside banks function to move savings to corporations and to exercise corporate 
control (Thakor, 1996; Allen, 1999). 
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spectrum of maturities.  Therefore, measuring changes in interest rates of a specific maturity 
fails to recognize the full impact of the yield curve changes on the bank’s equity value.  
Thus, to capture the changes in the entire yield curve the paper employs the Nelson-Siegel 
(1987) three-factor model.  The paper uses Diebold and Li’s (2006) parsimonious 
representation, which imposes only a small number of parameters and provides flexibility 
to reflect a range of monotonic, humped and S-type shapes typically observed in yield data. 
Let three latent factors 1,t, 2,t and 3,t be the long-term (level), short-term (slope) and 
medium-term (curvature) factors of the yield curve at time t, with corresponding factor 
loadings [1, (1 − e−𝜏𝜆𝑡)/𝜏𝜆𝑡 , (1 − e
−𝜏𝜆𝑡)/𝜏𝜆𝑡 − e
−𝜏𝜆𝑡] and parameter t is an optimal-fit 
parameter (decay factor) governing the shape of the second and third factor loadings5 at 
time t.  In this setting, the spot zero-yield curve6 yt () with maturity  at time t is formulated 
as follows: 
𝑦𝑡(𝜏) = 𝛽1,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑡 (
1−e−𝜏𝜆𝑡
𝜏𝜆𝑡
) + 𝛽3,𝑡 (
1−e−𝜏𝜆𝑡
𝜏𝜆𝑡
− e−𝜏𝜆𝑡)    (1) 
Eq. (1) can be estimated via the OLS with fixed .  To obtain the time series of the 
interest rate risk factors, first 1,t, 2,t and 3,t are estimated by fitting Eq.(1) to the yield 
curve.  Then, the first order differences of 1,t (level), 2,t (slope) and 3,t (curvature) are 
computed to capture yield curve changes.  Nelson-Siegel components have a clear 
interpretation as proxies of long, short and medium-term yields.  In particular, a shock in 
                                                 
5 The parameter λ determines the maximum loading of the curvature factor and the exponential decay rate of 
the slope. Large (small) values of λ generate fast (slow) decay and can better fit the curve at short (long) 
maturities. We follow Diebold and Li (2006) who fix λ at 0.0609 so that the loading on the curvature 
component is maximized at the medium term; that is, 30 months.  
6 A zero-coupon yield curve is the yield curve that maps zero-coupon Treasury bond yields to different 
maturities. Zero-coupon bonds have a single payment at maturity, so these curves enable us to price fixed-
income instruments. To obtain a continuous yield curve, and since zero coupon bonds are available for a 
limited number of maturities, bootstrapping and interpolation techniques are employed. 
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1,t affects uniformly all maturity yields, thereby causing a parallel shift in the location of 
the yield curve; as such, it is viewed as a long-term yield factor (this is called level).  Loading 
2,t is viewed as a short-term yield factor because it has a maximal impact on short maturities 
and a minimal effect on the distant yields, thereby causing a flattening/steepening of the 
curve (this is called slope).  Finally, 3,t  achieves its maximum at medium maturities thereby 
affecting medium term yields more than the short- and long-term rates (this is called 
curvature). 
2.2. A Dynamic Conditional Correlation Model for Time-Varying Betas 
Multiple regression models typically employed in the banking literature do not 
explicitly address the time-varying nature of the bank’s market and interest rate risk 
exposure.  Betas obtained within these models are constant over the entire estimation period 
or defined over lengthy sub-samples by either using binary dummy variables (Faff et al., 
2005) or by splitting the sample period (Oertmann et al., 2000).  Alternative approaches, 
such as rolling window estimation, although they do allow for time-variation in the 
coefficients, they restrict the betas to be constant over the embedded sub-samples.  Song 
(1994) is the first to apply the ARCH estimation framework arguing that betas should 
change as new information arrives in the market.  Subsequent research such as Flannery et 
al. (1997), Faff et al. (2005) and Carson et al. (2008) use different GARCH models to 
investigate banks’ interest rate exposure.  For example, Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) deploy 
a GARCH in mean approach to study the effect of yield changes and their associated 
volatilities on bank stock returns distributions.  
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In the current study, we derive the yield betas from the conditional covariances 
between the interest rate (IR) risk factors (level, slope and curvature) and the banks’ equity 
(BK) returns: 
𝛽𝐼𝑅,𝑡 = cov𝑡(𝑟𝐵𝐾,𝑡 , 𝑟𝐼𝑅,𝑡)/var𝑡(𝑟𝐼𝑅,𝑡);    (2)  
where βIR,t is the time-varying IR beta of the bank equity return (rBK,t) upon changes in the 
IR risk factor (rIR,t)  at time t; covt(rBK,t,rIR,t) is the conditional covariance between equity 
return (rBK,t) and the IR risk factor (rIR,t) at time t, while the vart (rIR,t) is the conditional 
variance of the IR risk factor (rIR,t) at time t.  Conditional covariances and variances are 
obtained from a diagonal dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH model, 
henceforth, DCC-MGARCH model.  The model has the following functional form (for more 
technical details, see Engle, 2002): 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 ~ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝐻𝑡),      (3) 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡,       (4) 
where rt is a [5  1] vector containing bank portfolio returns, market returns, and level, slope 
and curvature factors of the term structure in week t.  Ht is the [5  5] conditional covariance 
matrix among the five series.  Dt is a [5  5] diagonal matrix with its main diagonal equal 
to the standard deviation (ℎ𝑖,𝑡
1/2
) of the five variables in rt generated by an EGARCH (1,1) 
model; to accommodate asymmetries in the conditional variance dynamics.  Rt is a [5  5] 
conditional correlation matrix, which is derived as: 
𝑅𝑡 = (𝑄𝑡
∗)−1𝑄𝑡(𝑄𝑡
∗)−1,       (5) 
𝑄𝑡 = ?̅? − 𝐴
′?̅?𝐴 − 𝐵′?̅?𝐵 + 𝐴′𝜀𝑡−1
∗ 𝜀𝑡−1
∗ ′𝐴 + 𝐵′𝑄𝑡−1𝐵,   (6) 
where Qt* is a [5  5] diagonal matrix with its main diagonal elements equal to the square 
root of the diagonal elements of Qt to ensure correlations lie within the bounds [-1, 1].  𝑄𝑡 
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is a [5 × 5] symmetric matrix and ?̅? = E[*t*t’] is the unconditional covariance of 
standardized innovations estimated by its sample counterpart (1/𝑇) ∑ 𝜀𝑡
∗𝜀𝑡
∗′𝑇𝑡=1 . 
*
t is a [5 × 
1] vector containing the standardized innovations (𝜀𝑡
∗ =
𝜀𝑡
ℎ𝑡
 ) of the series.  
To capture the diversity in pair-specific correlation dynamics, A and B are set to [5 × 
5] diagonal parameter matrices, so that, the ARCH (GARCH) coefficients for each DCC 
pair are 𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑗𝑗 (𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗), where, 𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑎𝑗𝑗 (𝑏𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑗𝑗), respectively, are the ii
th and jjth 
element of the constant diagonal matrix A (B).  The diagonal DCC model allows for a 
distinct structure in each correlation process offering a richer representation of real-world 
dynamics.  This modeling approach facilitates the direct estimation of conditional betas 
using the time-dependent conditional correlations and variances of asset returns and factor 
dynamics (Longin and Solnik, 2001)7.  The coefficients of the model are estimated by quasi-
maximum likelihood. 
 
3. Data 
The dataset includes bank equity prices from the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK) during the period from December 10, 1997 to June 15, 2016, as well as from 
Japan (JP) and Europe (EU) during the period February 5, 2003 to June 15, 20168.  The 
whole sample amounts to 360 banks and only those listed on the main stock exchanges of 
each market are considered.  The breakdown of the banking portfolios, by country and size, 
                                                 
7 A generalized asymmetric version of the DCC-MGARCH model is also tested.  This specification captures 
the asymmetric impact of positive and negative shocks between the endogenous and one exogenous factor (at 
a time) on conditional correlations.  Asymmetric effects on conditional correlations, however, were found to 
be insignificant and, hence, not accounted for. 
8 The start date for these regions is set to February 5, 2003 because Japanese and European yield curve data 
are only available from January 2003 and May 2002, respectively. 
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is provided in Table 1.  For the European banking sector, the analysis focuses on four major 
markets, namely Germany, France, Spain and Italy.  The current sample represents 
approximately 50% of the total market share of global financial assets (bonds, equities and 
bank assets).  Moreover, these markets contribute more than 45% to the global GDP and 
around 60% to the total stock market capitalization in 2013 (Global Financial Stability 
Report, Oct. 2014). 
Midweek9 equity prices for the banks in the sample along with the corresponding 
equity market indices are collected in local currency terms from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. The equity indices used are S&P 500, FTSE 100, NIKKEI 225 and EURO 
STOXX for the US, UK, Japan and EU market, respectively.  To eliminate the impact of 
survivorship bias, the sample consists of all banks with available data during the sample 
period even if data availability begun after the starting date and/or finished before the end 
date of the sample period.  The weekly term structure of interest rates in the US, UK and 
Japan is represented by the zero-yield curves with 11 maturities from 3-month to 10-year 
(3, 6, 12 months, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 years), while for the European market, the yield curve 
is based on European AAA-rating treasuries.  The zero-yield curve is derived from 
government treasury strips with all data provided by Bloomberg. 
Equally weighted banking portfolios are constructed within each market10.  Four size 
portfolios are formed: the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), the large, 
                                                 
9 The paper employs weekly data because daily returns departures from the normal distribution are more 
pronounced (Fama, 1976; Trzcinka, 1986).  In particular, daily returns are subject to a high level of skewness 
and results of the APT tests improve when every other observation is used (Roll and Ross, 1980). Moreover, 
the use of lower sampling frequency (monthly compared to weekly data) reduces not only the noisiness of the 
data but also the number of observations, which might reduce the significance of the interest rate beta estimates 
and consequently the reliability of the coefficient estimates and tests. 
10 The choice of the equal weighting is based on the presence of size-homogeneity since the equity portfolios 
are grouped according to bank’s size.  One may also argue that stocks within a portfolio are not under-/over-
weighted due to mispricing or mirroring emotions over the short-term and thus pricing errors remain random. 
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medium and small bank portfolios for each country where possible.  The SIFIs are identified 
by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) across the four markets examined11.  The large, 
medium and small banks are grouped according to the average size of their asset value over 
the sample period.  Following Elyasiani and Mansur (1998), banks with average asset value 
exceeding 50 billion US dollars are categorized as either SIFIs or large banks; to avoid 
overlapping, SIFIs are excluded from the large bank portfolio.  Banks with average asset 
value in excess of 10 billion US dollars, but no more than 50 billion US dollars, are 
categorized as medium.  The remaining banks, with asset value less than 10 billion US 
dollars, form the small portfolio.  Banks with an average asset value less than 1 billion US 
dollars are excluded from our sample.  These are community banks and their yield exposure 
may be smaller or larger because they do not have access to derivatives-based hedging (they 
could restrict exposure, though, through balance sheet choices and/or asset-liability 
management).  The UK banks are all in the same portfolio given that all of them are 
categorized as SIFIs. 
Table 1 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the weekly returns of the banking 
equity portfolios.  For each category, summary statistics along with the respective 
autocorrelation tests and the squared series are reported.  Annualized mean returns are 
relatively low as a direct result of the financial crisis and they range from -8.46% for the 
                                                 
11 The list of systemically important banks is reported in the FSB announcement “Policy Measures to Address 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions” on November 4, 2011. The FSB was established in April 2009 
as the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). The FSF was founded in 1999 by the G7 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors. In the FSB announcement 29 bank holding companies have been 
labeled as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) due to their importance to the global financial 
stability, out of which 23 are based in the U.S., UK, Japan and EU. FSB last update was on November 6, 2014.  
For further discussion on the size effect of financial intermediaries’ risk exposure, please see Demsetz and 
Strahan (1997), De Nicoló et al. (2004) and Elyasiani et al. (2007) among others. 
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large EU banks to 2.61% for the small US banks.  The realized mean returns of the SIFI, 
large and medium banking portfolios are, on average (across countries), -2.49%, -3.08% 
and -2.46% respectively; while small banking portfolios have performed slightly better (i.e. 
-0.17%) evident also from the reported EU and US returns.  The annualized standard 
deviation, across all portfolios, ranges from 15.68% for the medium EU banks to 39.90% 
per annum for the Japanese SIFIs and is positively associated with size i.e. larger banks 
experience higher volatility.  The overall average standard deviation of the small, medium, 
large and SIFI portfolios is 18.8%, 20.9%, 28.3%, and 36.2% per annum respectively.  In 
addition, the negative skewness and excess kurtosis signify that the unconditional 
distribution of bank returns is not normal.  This is confirmed with the use of Jarque and Bera 
(1980) test indicating departures from normality for all the bank returns, at 1% significance 
level.  Based on the Ljung-Box (1978) Q statistics on the first five and ten lags of the sample 
autocorrelation function, all series exhibit positive serial correlation at conventional 
significance levels.  Exceptions are the small US (fifth lag) and small JP banking portfolios 
(fifth and tenth lag).  The ARCH test, carried out as the Ljung-Box Q statistic on the squared 
series, indicates the existence of heteroscedasticity.  This provides preliminary evidence in 
support for the use of time-varying conditional variance for the bank stock return data. 
Note that prior to the 2007 financial crisis all portfolios exhibited higher average 
returns ranging from 1% to even 28% in excess of those presented in Table 1.  In particular, 
prior to August 2007 all returns are positive (only exception is the JP small portfolio) with 
relatively lower standard deviation by 70bp to 1,600bp compared to the figures in Table 1, 
which refer to the whole sample period.  For example, during the period December 1997 to 
August 2007 (August 2007 to June 2016) the US SIFIs mark an average return of 4.31% (-
14 
 
6.7%) p.a. with an annual standard deviation of 27.3% (39.9%).  The recent financial crisis 
amplified the banks’ riskiness as their equity returns’ standard deviation increased 
noticeably and their stocks plummeted during that period.  All the aforementioned results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Term Structure Model Estimates 
The yield curves and the estimated level, slope and curvature factors over the sample period 
are presented in Figure 1 for the US, UK, EU and JP.  According to Figure 1, significant 
changes occurred in all yield curves during the sample period.  Specifically, the short-end 
of the US, UK and EU yield curves increased gradually during the build-up of the most 
recent financial crisis before dropping sharply at the end of 2007.  The policy of lower 
interest rates conducted by the Federal Reserve during the late 2007 and 2008, the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP; US Congress, Oct. 2008), the Fed’s quantitative easing (QE) 
policies and the bailout decisions during and after the crisis were all aimed to restore 
stability and ease the liquidity pressure in financial markets.  In contrast, the interest rate 
environment in Japan appears relatively stable with the short-term rate almost zero over the 
whole sample period apart from a small jump before the crisis.  Since the mid-90s, the low 
interest rate environment observed in Japan is mainly due to the central bank’s policy to 
stimulate economic growth.  This policy, however, has been unable to pull the country out 
of deflation and fuel economic boom over the last decade.  
Figure 1 
Looking at the changing economic conditions (business cycles), one can notice that 
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the slope tends to reach its peak just before the recession, while the yield curve tends to 
flatten near the top of the business cycle.  There is prior literature on the interaction between 
the term structure factors and macro-variables/business cycles where different relationships, 
including directional influences, are identified (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Ang and 
Piazzesi, 2003; Evans and Marshall, 2007).  The literature documents that slope relates to 
business cycle conditions, while level relates to inflation expectations.  It also identifies 
monetary policy as a factor explaining most of the changes in the slope and thus relating 
economic expansion/contraction to interest rate increases/decreases (Dewachter and Lyrio, 
2006; Diebold et al., 2006; Aguiar-Conraria et. al., 2012).  Actually, the interbank 
borrowing cost increased dramatically following the liquidity squeeze in August 2007, 
which led to the financial panic in the Fall of 2008 (Acharya and Merrouche, 2013). 
To investigate the credibility of the estimated factors to represent the level, slope 
and curvature, the correlation between the estimated factors and standard empirical proxies 
is examined in Table 2.  We use yt(120), yt(120) − yt(3) and 2yt(24) − yt(3) − yt(120) 
as empirical proxies for the level, slope and curvature, respectively; where yt(3), yt(24) 
and yt(120) respresent the short- (3-month), medium- (2-year) and long-term (10-year) 
yields (Diebold and Li, 2006).  The estimated factors are highly correlated with the 
corresponding empirical proxies (in line with Diebold et al., 2006) and as such they 
sufficiently represent the shape of the yield curve.  It is worth noting, however, that since 
the long-end of the yield curve is relatively stable over time and as term to maturity 
approaches infinity, the three-factor term structure model collapses to a single factor model 
represented by the level factor loading (i.e. yt() = β1,t  see Eq.1).  Thus, the slope factor is 
mainly driven by the short-term rates and is a proxy for either the yield spread or just the 
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short-end of the yield curve (Diebold et al., 2006).  
Table 2 
Moreover, Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the yield factor data.  Non-
parametric unit root tests (Phillips and Perron, 1988) indicate that all series contain unit 
roots, while their first differences are stationary.  First differences exhibit signs of serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity supporting the use of time-varying conditional variance.  
Table 2 reports the Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) in cumulative terms i.e. start with 
the level factor, then add the slope and finally add the curvature factor.  The results imply 
that all three factors are essential to describe the yield curve.  That is, the RMSE reduction 
is in the range of 55% to 68% (83% to 91%) when comparing the two (three) factor model 
to the one factor benchmark. 
4.2. The Dynamics of Conditional Correlation 
Before analyzing the bank’s time-varying yield exposure, the estimation results from 
the diagonal DCC-MGARCH model, across all markets, are presented.  A two-stage 
procedure is employed (Engle, 2002).  The first step involves the estimation of univariate 
EGARCH (1,1) models for the dynamics in conditional variances of the bank portfolios as 
well as market, level, slope and curvature factors (results available upon request).  The 
second step involves the estimation of conditional correlations dynamics.  Table 3 reports 
the estimation results from the second step of the MGARCH estimation. 
Table 3 
Table 3, Panel A reports the estimated parameters along with their estimated 
standard errors.  The DCC-MGARCH estimates aij (Eq. 6), measuring the sensitivities of 
bank portfolio and factor correlations to market shocks, are statistically significant in nearly 
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all equations with figures ranging between 0.0547 and 0.4009.  Estimates bij, measuring the 
sensitivity of current correlation to past correlation values, range from 0.7763 to 0.9960 
with all parameters being statistically significant.  The coefficients for each DCC pair, i.e. 
bank portfolio – risk factor, that correspond to sensitivities of correlations to market shocks 
is given by the product 𝑎𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑎𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (see Eq. 6), which ranges between 0.0048 (EU 
small; 𝑎𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑎𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) to 0.0468 (UK SIFI; 𝑎𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑎𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) and tend to be higher for 
the portfolio-level and the portfolio-slope pairs.  The coefficients that measure the 
sensitivity of current correlation to past correlation values (𝑏𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑏𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟), range from 
0.6078 (JP small; 𝑏𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) to 0.9902 (JP SIFI; 𝑏𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡). 
 As shown in Table 3, Panel B, the degree of persistence in conditional correlation 
between bank equity returns and risk factors is less than unity (ranging between 0.6297 and 
0.9972) implying that dynamic correlations are all stationary.  Persistent co-movements lend 
support to the presence of predictable patterns in correlation dynamics and reflect slow mean 
reversion in correlations due to the existence of transitory trends.  For example, with the 
exception of JP (large, medium, small portfolios) persistence in conditional correlations 
between bank portfolios and interest rate factors is in all cases high and above 0.92.  This 
finding has important implications for risk and portfolio management.  Specifically, it 
implies that the impact of a shock in the yield curve on the conditional correlation between 
the interest rate risk factors and the bank’s equity will have long lasting effects i.e. shocks 
to both yield curve and bank equity returns have a prolonged impact on the subsequent 
dependency.  On the other hand, models for the JP portfolios, except from SIFIs, produce 
less persistence in correlation (from 0.6297 to 0.8773) compared to US, UK and EU; yet, 
overall all correlations are persistent. 
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4.3. Banks’ Time-Varying Yield Curve Exposure 
The conditional beta estimates for the market factor and the three yield curve 
components (level, slope and curvature), derived from the DCC-MGARCH model, are 
plotted in Figure 2.  Since same factor betas exhibit similar patterns across size-portfolios, 
and due to space limitations, only the graphs for the SIFIs are presented (full results 
available upon request).  Figure 2 illustrates the evolutions of the time-varying conditional 
betas for SIFIs. 
Figure 2 
The impact of the level factor (long-term rates) on banks’ equity returns is largely 
positive, implying that an increase in long-term yields increases the value of the bank’s 
equity, while changes in the slope factor (short-term rates) have the opposite effect12.  The 
time-variation in the estimates is in line with previous studies (Song, 1994; Oertmann et al., 
2000).  In particular, the model-implied time series of betas (market, level, slope and 
curvature) is closely linked to the global economic cycles.  That is, banks’ market and yield 
exposures (betas’ absolute values) are lower during the pre-crisis period compared to the 
period from the onset of the crisis and beyond. 
Following from the above, the average weekly betas over the whole sample period 
are presented in Table 4.  Market betas are highly significant and positive, while their 
magnitude increases with the bank’s size.  For example, the market beta of the US SIFIs is 
1.4589 whereas the ones of the large, medium and small banking portfolios are 1.1379, 
0.9843 and 0.7687, respectively.  This is in line with banks (especially large ones) being 
highly leveraged with an increased appetite for risky investments and engagement in off-
                                                 
12 The positive relationship between long-term rates and equity returns can be attributed to the negative 
maturity gaps, that banks usually run, which in turn increases the bank’s net interest income. 
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balance-sheet activities (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; De Nicoló et al., 2004).  It is also 
worth noting that most of the largest banks are included in the market index and, thus, their 
correlation with the market return is naturally higher. 
Turning to the banks’ overall yield exposure, the equity returns of all portfolios are 
significantly affected by all three components of the yield curve.  Bank size is an important 
determinant of the extent of yield curve exposure as the factor loadings are higher for SIFIs 
and large banks compared to medium and small banks.  For the curvature, the effect is 
overall positive, with the exception of the Japanese portfolios where the impact is negative.  
The effect of curvature is less clear-cut, however, and there is no macroeconomic variable 
associated with this latent factor (Diebold et al., 2006).  Shocks to the yield curve level 
(slope) factor have a significant positive (negative) impact on the banking portfolio’s equity 
returns over the whole sample period. 
Table 4 
Looking closer at the slope and level factors of the yield curve, a couple of 
arguments can be put forward.  The significant negative beta associated with the yield 
curve’s slope (short-term) factor may be due to the fact that changes in the term structure of 
interest rates are closely related to the business cycle (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Diebold 
et al., 2006, 2008) and inflation (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001).  At the same time, future real 
economic activity is driven by the current monetary policy (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; 
Fischer, 1993).  An expansionary monetary policy will steepen the yield curve and enhance 
the short-term real economic growth (Estrella, 2005).  Steepening of the yield curve, for 
banks experiencing a negative maturity gap, will enhance their profitability.  That is, short-
term financing costs will remain below the long-term investment returns, which in turn this 
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widening yield spread (steepening yield curve) will serve as a conduit of increasing the 
bank’s net interest income.  During the 2002-07 economic boom, banks chose to expose 
themselves to yield curve changes as they took advantage of the low short-term rate 
environment by rapidly expanding their balance sheets through short-term borrowing 
(Adrian and Shin, 2008; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011).  Banks are, therefore, more likely 
to ride the steepening yield curve (negative slope factor beta)13 as a result of frequently 
refinancing their short-term liabilities (Acharya et al., 2011). 
Turning to the level factor, its positive and significant beta can be attributed to the fact 
that an increase in long-term interest rates mirrors higher long-term inflation expectation 
(Diebold et al., 2006).  Moreover, an increase in the long-end of the yield curve (higher 
level factor) can be associated with loosening of monetary policy, which implies a reduction 
in the short-end of the yield curve.  That means banks can benefit from positive shocks in 
the level factor indirectly through the increase in short-term credit supply.  To this end, an 
impulse response function is employed to endorse the inverse relationship between the level 
and slope of the yield curve.  The results (available upon request) indicate that there is a 
lead-lag effect between changes in the level and slope factors.  Specifically, shocks in the 
level factor have a negative and long-lasting impact on the slope – in line with Diebold et 
al. (2006). 
Finally, yield curve fluctuations can influence banks’ equity returns via macro 
factors.    Corporate default rates are highly related to the business cycle, which in turn are 
influenced by the real economic activity (Pesaran et al., 2006).  Since relative changes in 
the level and the slope of the yield curve are leading indicators of the real economic activity 
                                                 
13 Under these circumstances, banks enjoy an increased net interest income from the carry trade, where 
long-term high yield investments are financed by short-term low-cost liabilities. 
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and business cycle (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998), they can also be deployed to assess the 
business loans’ default risk (Carling et al., 2007).  A prolonged flattening yield curve can 
have a negative impact on real economic activity, which may point out towards an economic 
recession.  In particular, positive shocks in the slope factor can mirror an increase in 
corporate default rates, which in turn have a negative impact on the bank equity capital 
through the rise in debt write-offs (Drehamann et al., 2010). 
4.4. The Impact of Crisis on Yield Curve Risk Exposure 
August 9, 2007 and June 30, 2009 mark the start and the end of the recent financial 
crisis14.  The financial crisis began when BNP Paribas stopped the redemption of its 
investment funds, followed by the liquidity squeeze in global financial markets; while the 
end of the crisis is based on the S&P 500 having noticeably bypassed its lowest point (March 
2009) and following an upward trend well above the last trough.  Table 5 summarizes the 
average weekly beta by splitting the sample into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods to 
further investigate the bank’s equity yield exposure over different market conditions. 
Table 5 
Starting with the wide market effect, the US SIFIs’ exposure increased from 1.334 
during the pre-crisis period to 1.921 during the crisis and then fell to 1.508 after 2009.  In 
                                                 
14 For a broader academic discussion see Acharya and Merrouche (2013). For market reactions, regarding the 
start of the crisis, see the financial press: The New York Times, August 9, 2007 “BNP Paribas suspends funds 
because of subprime problems”; Financial Times, August 12, 2007 “Scramble for cash reflects fears for 
system”; The Guardian, August 5, 2008 “Credit crisis - how it all began”.  After the BNP announcement, The 
European Central Bank pumped €95bn into the Eurozone banking market to allay fears about a sub-prime 
credit crunch (see BBC News, August 9, 2007 “ECB moves to help banking sector”).  During June 2009, a 
number of events took place that contributed to signify the end of the financial turmoil.  Such events (in 
addition to the S&P500 upward trend) include: ten large banks allowed to exit the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) with the Treasury receiving $68.3 billion (09/06) – more than a quarter of the bailout funds 
that banks have received since October 2008; the Fed extends and modifies a number of its liquidity programs 
(09/24); and AIG and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York entered into an agreement to reduce AIG’s debt 
(09/25); and finally the TED spread fell at 35 basis point – a decrease of more than 400 basis points from 
October 2008. 
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other words, banks were almost twice as risky as the general market.  Although a few were 
included in the market index, some were too big or too systemically relevant to fail and were 
expected to be bailed out.  Their riskiness was due to the fact that they were highly engaged 
in the asset-backed securities market.  The changes in the banking sector’s market exposure 
are associated with the global economic conditions at that time.  Their increased exposure 
during the crisis period makes economic sense and is intertwined with liquidity conditions 
in home markets, their potential systemic nature and/or bailout possibilities.  The reduced 
exposure, post 2009, is attributed to the optimism of the whole stock market (e.g. S&P 500 
rises), which came as a result of the government aid through the bailouts of various 
institutions, the TARP and the quantitative easing initiatives. 
 Turning to the bank’s yield exposure, over these distinctive economic phases, there 
is a worth noting swift in the sign of the slope risk factor, while its significance remains 
high.  Interestingly, the slope factor beta turns from negative to positive for the US SIFIs 
and large banks during the financial crisis.  In tranquil periods, banks’ short-term funding 
cost (LIBOR rates) is tied to the short-end of the Treasury yield curve.  With New Century 
Financial and Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy, Wachovia and Washington Mutual’s 
fall, the near collapse of AIG and every other major US financial institution reflecting on 
the consequences of this turmoil, investor’s confidence weakened as the crisis deepened in 
mid-September 2008.  As a result, the difference between the US dollar LIBOR rates and 
the Treasury yields widened in late 200815.  Thus, during the peak of the crisis, the short-
end of the Treasury yield curve has an inverse relationship with the short-term interbank 
                                                 
15 The LIBOR rates and short-term Treasury yields commonly move in the same direction.  The TED spread 
(LIBOR minus T-bill rates) is regarded as a measure of liquidity and credit risk.  In other word, an increasing 
TED mirrors the lack of interbank trust and a corresponding credit tightening for all other counterparties. 
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funding costs.  The slope factor proxies changes in short-term yields, hence, its relationship 
with the US SIFIs and large banks’ equity returns became positive during the crisis period. 
Looking at the size of the yield beta estimates, the level beta has increased 
significantly from 0.037 (until 2007) to 0.085 during the crisis, while this increase persisted 
after the crisis as well (value of 0.086 over the post-crisis period).  Similar are the findings 
for the slope factor: a beta of -0.016 for the pre-crisis increasing to 0.036 during crisis and 
then plummeting to -0.079 during the post-crisis period.  As for the curvature, results are 
0.006 (pre-crisis) rising to 0.018 (during crisis) and then down to -0.005 (post-crisis), all 
being statistically significant.  In all cases, more than 80% of the time, the sensitivities 
during the crisis and the post-crisis periods are, on average, higher in magnitude than the 
corresponding pre-crisis sensitivities.  Additional t-tests, reported in Table 5, show that 
equality of the average weekly betas over the pre-crisis and during the crisis periods cannot 
be confirmed.  On the other hand, a distinction between the crisis and post-crisis period 
indicates very little evidence in support of the hypothesis that beta values moved back to 
their pre-crisis levels with very few exceptions such as the market, level and slope factor 
betas of the EU small bank portfolio. 
Given the aforementioned discussion, what underpins the reported results can be 
broadly attributed to endogenous (within the bank) and/or exogenous factors (outside the 
bank), as well as/or changes in investors’ behavior.  Starting with the endogenous factors, 
balance sheet restructuring could well be one of the attributing factors to such yield 
sensitivity; off-balance sheet items have also played a significant role in exposing banks to 
various risks depending on the nature of the products involved.  Banks have certainly altered 
the product/duration mix of their funding sources as well as their investment choices due to 
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the deteriorating market conditions.  Fluctuations in interest rates are correlated with 
cyclical changes in economic conditions and exert their own influence on the different 
components of a bank’s profitability. 
Turning to the exogenous factors, short-term interest rates started declining (late 
2007) through a series of rate cuts aiming to ease the funding liquidity pressure in the 
financial system.  The significant slope factor indicates that banks have benefited from the 
lower funding rates provided by central banks.  Market interventions, during and after the 
crisis period, have also played a role in the increased slope factor sensitivity (i.e. short-term 
end of the yield curve).  The enhanced slope factor effect may also be attributed to the 
deteriorating funding conditions during late 2007 (Ashcarft et al., 2011; Acharya and 
Merrouche; 2013), which have forced banks to rely more on short-term liabilities (demand 
deposits, commercial papers etc.) for liquidity, compared to the pre-crisis period.  Therefore, 
banks’ equity returns experience an inverse relationship with changes in short-term interest 
rates.  Banks also issued a large amount of loan commitment that did not, in general, expect 
to be exercised but serious liquidity shortages (i.e. market freeze) led loan commitment 
holders to draw down on the commitments, forcing banks to seek funds more vigorously.  
This may have made bank stocks more sensitive to changes in yields. 
Finally, changes in investors’ behavior during the crisis period may have contributed 
to the increased level effect.  The flight-to-quality phenomenon is commonly observed 
during economic downturns as investors switch from risky investments to safe securities 
with lower credit risk exposure (Chari et al., 2008).  Since the demand for Treasury bonds 
is closely related to the liquidity condition in the stock market16, investors’ flight-to-quality 
                                                 
16 When there is high selling pressure in the stock market, equity liquidity drops; but liquidity in the Treasury 
bond market increases as buying pressure is high (Li et al., 2009). 
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behavior tends to depress the banks’ equity prices, while pushing the Treasury bond prices 
up (long-term yields drop).  As a result, the relationship between banks’ equity returns and 
long-term yields would be strengthened during the crisis, which is evident from the increase 
in the level factor betas. 
One interesting finding is that although all banking institutions become more 
vulnerable to short-term rate changes (i.e. negative slope factor betas), during and after the 
crisis period, the effect seems to be more notable for the SIFIs and large banks.  One could 
argue that the bank’s yield sensitivity is the direct result of its nominal contracting (Flannery 
and James, 1984a; Gomez et al., 2016).  That is, some of the banks will unavoidably have 
wider/narrower maturity gaps than others resulting in a more sensitive balance sheet 
structure when short-term yield changes hit the market.  To take the matter further, such 
yield sensitivity also depends on the banks’ liquidity positions as well as on their loan 
commitment obligations.  For instance, the slope factor effect for the Japanese SIFIs banking 
portfolio has increased in magnitude from -0.158 to -0.309 during the crisis period, while 
the one for the small banking portfolios had a marginal change of 0.009 (-0.056 to -0.065).  
Moreover, the observed size effect (i.e. the increase in the absolute value of slope factor 
beta is higher for SIFIs and large banks during the crisis) may stem from the precautionary 
hoarding17 of liquidity during the recent financial crisis.  It is indeed true that banks were 
reluctant to lend money to each other during the 2007 financial crisis due to liquidity 
constraints and needs for self-insurance against payment uncertainties, especially for 
                                                 
17 Precautionary hoarding occurs when banks hold more reserve and liquidity than the level needed to self-
insure against shocks.  This hoarding reduces the amount of available funding for the interbank loan market.  
As a result, liquidity shortages in the interbank market had a greater impact on the US banks than those in 
Japan.  The roots of hoarding liquidity, in general, can be either speculative or precautionary (Ashcraft et al., 
2011; Acharya and Merrouche, 2013). 
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smaller banks with high credit risk (Ashcraft et al., 2011; Acharya and Merrouche, 2013).  
In general, during the crisis market participants become more responsive to any event and 
require a higher premium for a given unit of risk, which translates into higher sensitivity.  
Large banks are usually net borrowers and rely heavily on short-term interbank funding, so 
the funding liquidity shortage during and after the crisis increased the associated fear of 
being left with no liquidity, therefore, heightening those institutions’ short-term yield 
sensitivity relative to the smaller banks. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Over the last three decades, global financial markets have witnessed a variety of 
events making the banking sector an interesting landscape to observe and analyze.  To this 
end, the paper provides new information about a) the bank’s equity behavior when 
accounting for the yield curve’s short-, long- and medium-term components (slope, level, 
curvature), which they enter the equity return generating process as exogenous risk factors; 
b) the bank’s equity function using the comprehensive econometric framework of DCC-
MGARCH allowing for time variation in factor loadings, c) the bank’s yield sensitivity 
when banks are separated according to size and their systemic risk, d) banks belonging to 
market-oriented and bank-oriented economic systems, and e) the importance of economic 
cycles on banks’ stock market performance in relation to yield curve changes. 
The findings suggest that the empirical proxies for level, slope and curvature of the 
yield curve are statistically able to explain variation in equity prices above and beyond the 
wide market effect.  There is evidence of time variation in the interest rate risk factors whose 
magnitude is linked to the global economic cycles.  That is, absolute values of pre-crisis 
betas are lower than those in the period from the onset of the crisis and beyond.  Shocks to 
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the slope factor have overall a negative impact on bank equity returns with the findings 
being pretty much consistent across markets and institutions.  For the US SIFIs and large 
banks, the changing sign as well as the size of the slope factor coefficient is something worth 
mentioning, as it turns (from negative) positive and becomes larger at the peak of the 
economic crisis.  Unexpected changes to the level factor unveil a positive correlation with 
expected returns, a consistent finding across our international banking sample.  Shocks in 
the level factor have a negative impact on the slope and banks are indirectly benefited from 
such shocks through an increase in the short-term credit supply.  The impact of the curvature 
is less clear-cut since there is no precise pattern either among banks with different sizes or 
between financial systems (bank-oriented versus market-oriented).  Market risk exposure 
is, as expected, positively correlated with bank size irrespective of the financial system 
observed.  The systematic market exposure is more pronounced with larger banks, across 
all markets, and in many cases over twice as strong when we look at small banks versus 
SIFIs.  Finally, when distinct economic cycles are taken into account, the bank equity 
exposure to all systematic risks is noticeably different across these cycles.  In all cases 
considered, more than 80% of the time, the sensitivities during the crisis and the post-crisis 
periods are, on average, higher in magnitude than the corresponding pre-crisis estimates. 
The present work has important implications for various aspects of modern financial 
markets and opens avenues for future research.  First, by recognizing that the yield curve 
can be independently treated as a systematic risk factor, inevitably one recognizes its 
interface with areas such as central bank policy, investment theory, regulation and bank 
management.  Given that monetary policy affects the short-end of the yield curve (Fed fund 
rate), its impact via the yield curve spread on real economic activity is not questionable 
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(Friedman, 1996).  Second, the yield curve as a systematic risk factor provides insight into 
the investment/corporate arena by a) simultaneously assessing the importance of yield and 
market risk to guide fund managers towards their portfolio mix (debt/equity) or to embrace 
income-oriented equities, b) evaluating performance measurement within an asset pricing 
framework and/or when funds mix bonds and low-beta securities, c) analyzing the extent to 
which the risk premia are priced by the market, d) looking at the market portfolio as a “risk 
surrogate”, and e) emphasizing the wider contribution of corporate risk management to 
shareholder value (Bartram, 2000).  Third, and within an asset-liability management 
framework, bankers and supervisors can a) use the yield curve to establish short- and long-
term margin targets, as well as to evaluate the maturity mix of their assets and liabilities 
along with their respective repricing intervals and b) regularly assess the impact of the yield 
curve changes on the banking book and subsequently on value of the bank’s net-worth.  
Fourth, and as a consequence of the above discussion, regulators can consider bank 
performance as well as capital requirements, small business finance and economic growth 
by embracing a more comprehensive risk-return structure assuming an impartial macro-
prudential framework. 
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Table 1.   Summary Statistics of Bank Portfolio Returns 
The dataset contains bank equity prices from the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) during the period 
from December 10, 1997 to June 15, 2016, and from Europe (EU) and Japan (JP) during the period February 5, 2003 to 
June 15, 2016. “Mean” and “Std. Dev.” stand for the annualized average return and standard deviation for each banking 
portfolio, respectively. “JB” refers to the Jarque-Bera (1980) normality test statistics. Q (n) refers to the Ljung-Box (1978) 
test for the nth order serial correlation in the return series. Q2 (n) is the Engle’s (1982) test for ARCH effects with n lags.  
“N” is the number of banks that form each of the portfolios across markets.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
   Mean  Std  Skew Kurt JB test Q(5) Q(10) Q2(5) Q2(10) N 
Panel A:   US Sector Portfolios  
SIFI -0.946 33.91 -0.440 11.49 2933.8*** 19.46*** 33.18*** 168.7*** 238.6*** 8 
Large 0.310 28.70 -0.671 12.33 3578.2*** 35.18*** 44.92*** 227.3*** 260.9*** 11 
Medium 0.780 23.26 -0.456 8.474 1239.7*** 9.615* 21.45** 82.51*** 132.1*** 30 
Small 2.610 18.57 -0.074 10.93 2529.2*** 4.943 21.12** 90.86*** 122.1*** 172 
                    221 
Panel B:   UK Sector Portfolios 
 
 
  
than UD 
SIFI -4.576 35.60 -1.115 19.28 10862*** 26.65*** 31.84*** 152.3*** 172.8*** 5 
          5 
Panel C:   EU Sector Portfolios 
SIFI -4.155 35.34 -0.064 5.856 237.30*** 18.53*** 26.33*** 148.2*** 181.1*** 3 
Large -8.460 29.50 -0.033 4.644 78.642*** 12.70** 23.97*** 67.19*** 104.7*** 21 
Medium -5.668 15.68 -0.545 6.248 340.85*** 56.58*** 65.62*** 65.97*** 78.29*** 50 
Small 0.017 16.93 -0.302 5.074 135.49*** 24.59*** 28.49*** 49.29*** 63.77*** 10 
          84 
Panel D:   JP Sector Portfolios 
SIFI -0.294 39.90 -0.425 7.758 678.26*** 18.11*** 40.56*** 124.4*** 129.6*** 7 
Large -1.092 26.63 -0.460 7.017 493.18*** 14.72** 30.11*** 49.16*** 49.30*** 17 
Medium -2.506 23.62 -0.578 6.651 426.08*** 16.60*** 22.57** 27.35*** 28.91*** 19 
Small -3.130 21.04 -0.256 10.13 1485.5*** 8.531 9.857 22.22*** 23.19** 7 
          50 
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Table 2.   Summary Statistics of Yield Curve Factors 
PP is the Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root test, which tests the null hypothesis that the variable is non stationary, I(1), against 
the alternative that the variable is stationary, I(0); PP1 and PP2 refers to the series tested i.e. levels or changes, respectively.  
is the unconditional correlation of the yield factor with the empirical proxies proposed by Diebold et al. (2006); the row “Level” 
refers to the unconditional correlation between the estimated level factors and the 10-year yields, yt(120); row “Slope” refers 
to the unconditional correlation between the estimated slope factors and the difference between the 10-year and 3-month yields, 
yt(120) – yt(3); row “Curve” refers to the unconditional correlation between the estimated curvature factors and twice the two-
year yield minus the sum of the ten-year and three month yields, 2 yt(24) – yt(3) – yt(120).  The significance of  is based on 
the Student’s t-test with t-statistic =  / [(1–2) / (N–2)], where N is the number of weekly observations. RMSE is the Root 
Mean Squared Error of fitting the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model of Eq. (1) to the term structure of zero coupon yields; this 
is reported cumulatively i.e. when only the level factor is considered – row “Level”, when both level and slope factors are 
considered - “Slope” and when all three factors are taken into account - “Curve”. Ljung-Box (1978) and Engle’s (1982) test 
for ARCH effects are performed on the factor changes. See also notes in Table 1. 
 Mean Std  PP1 PP2 Q(5) Q(10) Q
2(5) Q2(10) RMSE 
Panel A:   US Yield Curve Factors 
Level 4.652 1.093 0.923*** -1.472 -31.97*** 5.516 28.99*** 129.7*** 285.8*** 0.823 
Slope -2.520 1.679 -0.995*** -1.864 -32.83*** 9.429* 22.12** 56.33*** 130.3*** 0.263 
Curve -3.001 2.327 0.992*** -2.419 -32.87*** 30.29*** 34.53*** 131.3*** 207.7*** 0.076 
           
Panel B:   UK Yield Curve Factors 
Level 4.309 0.863 0.916*** -1.556 -32.11*** 5.991 15.45 81.96*** 181.6*** 0.610 
Slope -1.308 1.799 -0.999*** -1.709 -30.99*** 9.327 18.73** 99.95*** 122.8*** 0.208 
Curve -1.502 2.605 0.991*** -1.851 -35.04*** 13.48** 46.41*** 120.1*** 242.1*** 0.060 
           
Panel C:   EU Yield Curve Factors 
Level 3.512 1.222 0.961*** -0.709 -26.26*** 0.898 5.520 63.22*** 99.18*** 0.651 
Slope -2.070 1.185 -0.998*** -1.503 -23.70*** 16.79*** 18.93** 209.1*** 218.3*** 0.223 
Curve -2.781 1.669 0.963*** -2.337 -26.54*** 15.97*** 25.72*** 137.6*** 275.2*** 0.058 
           
Panel D:   JP Yield Curve Factors 
Level 1.488 0.633 0.978*** -0.589 -26.12*** 17.52*** 37.31*** 32.74*** 88.58*** 0.380 
Slope -1.215 0.590 -0.995*** -1.174 -27.25*** 24.63*** 42.89*** 36.15*** 56.72*** 0.172 
Curve -2.229 0.941 0.991*** -1.596 -27.90*** 13.75** 16.08** 41.03*** 54.40*** 0.064 
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Table 3.   Diagonal DCC Multivariate GARCH Estimation Results 
Pane A refers to the estimated coefficient from the diagonal DCC-MGARCH model (Eqs. 3 - 6) over the sample period; “ɑi” and “bi” refer to the elements 
within the parameter matrix A and B in the dynamic of conditional correlation (Eq. 6); “Portfolio” represents the corresponding banking portfolio; “Market” 
refers to the market risk represented by the equity market return; “Level”, “Slope” and “Curve” are the first difference of the level, slope and curvature factors 
which represents the changes in the yield curve.  In Panel B, the persistence in the correlation is measured by the sum of cross-products of parameter ai and bi 
between the portfolio and corresponding risk factors, i.e. the level of persistence in correlation with portfolio for the slope factor is equal to aPortfolio x aSlope + 
bPortfolio x bSlope.  All the estimated coefficients are significant at conventional significant levels except for the ones with “†” sign, which are insignificant. 
Sector 
Portfolios: 
US UK EU JP 
SIFI Large Medium Small SIFI SIFI Large Medium Small SIFI Large Medium Small 
Panel A.   Estimated Coefficients DCC 
ɑPortfolio 0.1212 0.1226 0.1116 0.1126 0.1617 0.1073 0.0912 0.0863 0.0547 0.0931 0.1204 0.1763 0.1038† 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) (0.037) (0.045) (0.042) (0.081) 
ɑMarket 0.1322 0.1403 0.1433 0.1361 0.1059 0.0932 0.1121† 0.0964 0.0877 0.0645 0.0711 0.0944 0.1139 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.083) (0.019) (0.015) (0.023) (0.040) (0.047) (0.068) 
ɑLevel 0.2774 0.2695 0.2679 0.2712 0.2888 0.2465 0.2426 0.2477 0.2501 0.1502† 0.1484† 0.1491† 0.2109† 
 (0.038) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036) (0.027) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.117) (0.119) (0.115) (0.147) 
ɑSlope 0.2533 0.2429 0.2408 0.2457 0.2895 0.2365 0.2368 0.2422 0.2431 0.1828 0.1791 0.1799 0.2111† 
 (0.046) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.023) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.098) (0.101) (0.097) (0.147) 
ɑCurve 0.1990 0.2180† 0.2383 0.2270 0.1911 0.1565 0.1558 0.1634 0.1625 0.1112 0.1152 0.1121 0.4009 
  (0.056) (0.185) (0.113) (0.102) (0.105) (0.029) (0.019) (0.010) (0.013) (0.069) (0.057) (0.050) (0.077) 
bPortfolio 0.9918 0.9848 0.9872 0.9812 0.9426 0.9860 0.9890 0.9862 0.9940 0.9960 0.8759 0.8718 0.7763 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.066) (0.035) (0.280) 
bMarket 0.9871 0.9877 0.9891 0.9882 0.9922 0.9886 0.9842 0.9883 0.9887 0.9942 0.9808 0.9745 0.8374 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.030) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.023) (0.050) (0.199) 
bLevel 0.9595 0.9617 0.9618 0.9604 0.9522 0.9644 0.9657 0.9632 0.9622 0.9696 0.9732 0.9726 0.8599 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.111) 
bSlope 0.9651 0.9681 0.9689 0.9678 0.9569 0.9662 0.9667 0.9645 0.9640 0.9677 0.9703 0.9699 0.7829 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.136) 
bCurve 0.9578 0.9496 0.9375 0.9408 0.9432 0.9943 0.9938 0.9936 0.9938 0.9757 0.9793 0.9795 0.8737 
  (0.027) (0.093) (0.057) (0.051) (0.052) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.034) (0.013) (0.012) (0.035) 
Panel B.   Persistence in Correlation with Portfolio 
Market 0.9951 0.9899 0.9924 0.9850 0.9523 0.9848 0.9835 0.9830 0.9875 0.9962 0.8677 0.8662 0.6619 
Level 0.9853 0.9801 0.9793 0.9729 0.9443 0.9773 0.9771 0.9713 0.9701 0.9797 0.8703 0.8742 0.6895 
Slope 0.9878 0.9832 0.9833 0.9773 0.9487 0.9781 0.9776 0.9721 0.9715 0.9809 0.8715 0.8773 0.6297 
Curve 0.9741 0.9619 0.9520 0.9487 0.9200 0.9972 0.9970 0.9940 0.9966 0.9822 0.8716 0.8736 0.7198 
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Table 4.   Average Weekly Beta for Banking Portfolios  
The table presents the average weekly beta over the whole sample period derived from 
conditional variance-covariance matrices estimated from the diagonal DCC-MGARCH model; 
weekly beta equals to the covariance between the risk factor (F) and portfolio return (Rp) 
divided by the variance of the risk factor (i.e. Cov(Rp,F)/Var(F)); “Market” refers to the market 
risk represented by the equity market return; “Level”, “Slope” and “Curve” are the first 
difference of the level, slope and curvature factors which represent the changes in the yield 
curve. The statistical significance of the average betas is computed by the t-stat. =?̅? / SE(?̅?), 
where ?̅? is the average weekly beta estimates over the estimation period and SE(?̅?)=stdev(?̅?)/ 
√N; N is the number of weekly observations.  All the estimated betas are significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
Factors SIFI Large Medium Small 
Panel A: US  
Market factor 1.4589 1.1379 0.9843 0.7687 
Level factor 0.0603 0.0387 0.0390 0.0296 
Slope factor -0.0345 -0.0327 -0.0338 -0.0244 
Curvature factor 0.0027 0.0064 0.0038 0.0035 
Panel B: UK  
Market factor 1.4110    
Level factor 0.0775    
Slope factor -0.0443    
Curvature factor 0.0098    
Panel C: EU  
Market factor 1.3657 1.1010 0.4892 0.4425 
Level factor 0.0911 0.0797 0.0315 0.0252 
Slope factor -0.0760 -0.0671 -0.0214 -0.0156 
Curvature factor 0.0223 0.0167 0.0087 0.0108 
Panel D: JP  
Market factor 1.2776 0.9153 0.8133 0.6616 
Level factor 0.2023 0.1169 0.1002 0.0720 
Slope factor -0.1888 -0.1144 -0.0989 -0.0692 
Curvature factor -0.0388 -0.0080 -0.0129 -0.0096 
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Table 5.   Average Weekly Betas for Banking Portfolios pre- and post-crisis 
The table presents to the average weekly beta over the pre-crisis, crisis and post- crisis period.  The differences between the pre-crisis 
betas against the betas during and after the crisis for each risk factor are investigated based on Welch’s Student’s t-test; all highly 
significant at the 5% confidence level of significance except for the ones with “†” sign, which are insignificant.  Additional t-tests are 
also reported in the form a “‡” sign under the pre-crisis and post-crisis columns implying that the null hypothesis of equality of the 
average weekly betas over the pre- and during crisis, and over the pre- and post-crisis periods, respectively, cannot be rejected at 5% 
significance level. See also notes in Table 4. 
 Pre-Crisis  During Crisis (2007-2009)  Post-Crisis 
Factors SIFI Large Medium Small  SIFI Large Medium Small  SIFI Large Medium Small 
Panel A: US 
Market 1.334 0.921 0.772 0.611  1.921 1.749 1.345 1.019  1.508 1.274 1.181 0.920 
Level 0.037 0.017 0.022 0.018  0.085 0.047 0.033 0.036  0.086 0.066 0.065 0.044 
Slope -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.014‡  0.036 0.004 -0.007 -0.010  -0.079 -0.066 -0.065 -0.043 
Curve 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.004  0.018 0.023 0.016 0.013  -0.005 0.001
† 0.000† 0.000† 
Panel B: UK 
Market 1.234     2.081     1.475 
   
Level 0.070‡     0.078     0.088 
   
Slope -0.032     -0.007
†     -0.072 
   
Curve 0.009     0.016     0.010
‡ 
   
Panel C: EU 
Market 1.084 0.743 0.330 0.427  1.595 1.164 0.595 0.477  1.486 1.315 0.563 0.443
‡ 
Level 0.059 0.042 0.017 0.025  0.106 0.095 0.039 0.031  0.108 0.100 0.039 0.024
‡ 
Slope -0.042 -0.031 -0.012‡ -0.015‡  -0.069 -0.055 -0.013 -0.014  -0.100 -0.094 -0.030 -0.016
‡ 
Curve 0.023 0.019 0.007 0.008  0.059 0.039 0.020 0.016  -0.012 -0.010 0.007
‡ 0.011 
Panel D: JP 
Market 1.317 0.902 0.804‡ 0.687  1.586 0.985 0.786 0.584  1.169 0.905
‡ 0.827 0.666 
Level 0.178 0.092 0.079 0.062  0.324 0.143 0.116 0.071  0.185
‡ 0.126 0.110 0.079 
Slope -0.158 -0.081 -0.071 -0.056  -0.309 -0.135 -0.113 -0.065  -0.176 -0.130 -0.113 -0.079 
Curve -0.050 -0.008 -0.011‡ -0.002  -0.015 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005  -0.038 -0008
‡ -0.015 -0.012 
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Figure 1.   Yield Curve and Factor Loading Estimates 
The diagrams illustrate the weekly zero-yield curves as well as the level, slope and curvature factor loading estimates 
across the US, UK, EU and JP.   
Panel A: US Market  
  
Panel B: UK Market  
 
Panel C: EU Market  
  
Panel D: JP Market  
 
40 
 
Figure 2.   Dynamics of Conditional Betas 
The diagrams illustrate the weekly conditional beta estimates derived from the diagonal DCC model for the US, UK, 
JP and EU SIFIs. The magnitude for market beta is on the right-hand side axis, while the magnitude for level, slope 
and curvature factor betas is on the left-hand side axis. 
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